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1. Introduction  
Adequate  devices  for  enforcing  contracts  condition  the  efficiency  of  economic 
exchanges. Modern economies are characterized by the existence of layers of legal institutions 
supporting contractual commitment, an aspect that has increasingly attracted the attention of 
scholars (Schwarz and Scott 2003; Schwartz and Watson 2004; Dixit 2004; Hadfield 2005; 
Rubin 2005). Most of the economic literature on this issue has focused on the role of judges 
and the optimal design of judicial institutions, with the objective of better delineating the class 
of problems over which public courts should have some discretionary power. More recently, 
Schwartz (2002) and Schwartz and Scott (2003) suggested broadening this perspective on 
contract law by taking into account other dimensions of contract regulation, namely legal 
terms that states should provide to firms in the contractual organization of their transactions. 
An economic theory of contract regulation would have a substantive as well as an institutional 
dimension; the former specifying what public authorities should do while the latter would 
determine which legal institutions should perform the required tasks.  
However, there is another trend in recent research that emphasizes the role of private 
micro-institutions in contract enforcement (Milgrom, North and Weingast 1990; Clay 1997; 
Greif 1989, 1993). These studies have essentially examined situations in which the absence of 
formal laws or state-enforcing capabilities leads agents to develop private mechanisms for 
guaranteeing  contracts.  Greif  (2005)  tentatively  captured  the  difference  between  the  two 
approaches  through  a  distinction  between  intentionally  designed  private  institutions  and 
spontaneous organic institutions
1. He also noted that we do not yet have a much needed body 
of knowledge about the respective efficiency of these devices, especially with regards to the 
functioning of such quasi-private institutions.  
In this paper we explore the possibility of bridging these two approaches. In doing so, 
we  contrast  the  complementary  perspective  with  the  substitution  perspective.  The 








































1  3 
enforcement  with  the  traditional  role  of  public  law  and  state-run  courts  (Richman  2005). 
Comparing the respective costs of public and private systems, this perspective suggests that 
private enforcement mechanisms can be superior to public ones (Bernstein 1992, 1996, 2001; 
Rubin, 2005). McMillan and Woodruff (2000) substantiate this view, showing the key role of 
private ordering under dysfunctional public order, while Richman (2005) goes a step further, 
arguing that agents deliberately avoid relying on courts for enforcing agreements. It could be 
so because formal rules are  at risk of undermining social norms that support most deals, 
which  involve  forms  of  reciprocity  among  participants  (Clay  1997).  Opposing  this 
“substitution”  perspective,  the  “complement”  perspective  rather  view  joint  uses  of 
formal/public and informal/private arrangements as guarantees of more efficient outcomes 
(Klein 1992, 1996; Lazzarini, Miller and Zenger 2004). The underlying assumption is that 
formal  contract  laws  provide  support  to  private  ordering  mechanisms,  preventing  ex  ante 
potential sources of litigations and reducing ex post enforcement and litigation costs. In what 
follows, we suggest that in many situations, hybrid institutions prevail that combine both 
private and public ordering, so that complementarities dominate.  
In order to substantiate our analysis, we start with a model proposed by Klein (1992, 
1996) in which there are complementarities between formal contract laws and reputation-
based mechanisms in enforcing private contracts. However, Klein’s model was focusing on 
bilateral  agreements  when  confronted  to  the  risk  of  contractual  hold  up.  We  extend  the 
analysis to multilateral agreements and to problems of private third party enforcement in the 
more general context of collective action (Greif 2005). We illustrate with an example from the 
agricultural  sector,  the  cattle  industry.  We  think  that  the  agricultural  sector  provides 
particularly relevant examples. Contract regulation in this sector endorses various forms for 
which the support of law plays a crucial role, framing individual private contracts as well as 








































1  4 
motivated by the coexistence of informal contracts and collective organizations that rely on a 
mix  of  formal  contract  laws  framing  these  organizations  and  private  rules  guiding  their 
interactions  with  agro-food  firms.  This  heterogeneity  of  arrangements  provides  a  nice 
opportunity to compare the respective role of public and private ordering.  
The  paper  is  organized  as  follows.  Section  2  develops  our  analytical  framework, 
extending  Klein’s  model  to  multilateral  agreements  required  in  the  context  of  collective 
action. Section 3 substantiates the analysis with data about the evolution of formal contract 
laws framing the French collective organization of producers with an important role left for 
private ordering. Our empirical data are essentially from the cattle industry. However we 
argue that the problem at stake is general and concerns all forms of collective action involving 
contractual relationships.  Section 4 discusses the consequences of the extension of a bilateral 
approach to a multilateral reputation model in order to exhibit how collective organizations 
complement formal contract laws. Section 5 concludes in emphasizing how, when transactors 
are confronted to heterogeneous coalitions, a legal framework can support and improve the 
efficiency of private institutions, thus increasing the self-enforcing range of contracts.  
2. Our analytical framework 
The analytical background of our analysis is a blend of Klein reputation model and 
Greif model on how legal rules and private institutions frame collective action. Klein (1992, 
1996)  focused  on  the  role  of  private  reputation  as  a  mechanism  of  self-enforcement  that 
would  significantly  extend  the  range  of  contractual  arrangements.  However,  in  specific 
situations, this view has been challenged by several contributors who emphasized that the 
development  of  formal  legal  systems  for  enforcing  contracts  might  challenge  the  role  of 
informal  reputation-based  mechanisms  (Clay  1997,  Rubin  2005).  The  agricultural  sector 
provides  a  good  opportunity  to  confront  these  views  since  contracts  in  that  sector  are 








































1  5 
sensitive to the perishable nature of the products traded and to the possibility of fraud because 
of  severe  quality  measurement  problems  due  to  characteristics  hardly  observable  (Barzel 
1982). These properties challenge the role of individual reputation mechanisms as well as 
enforcement  of  contracts  by  public  courts  and  are  often  used  for  legitimating  collective 
organizations  (Danet  1982).  In  that  perspective,  collective  organizations  would  provide 
guarantees  that  neither  bilateral  reputation  mechanisms  nor  public  enforcement  by  courts 
could offer, at least with the same degree of efficiency. 
2.1. Some Preliminary Observations 
Indeed, a non negligible body of literature on enforcement has shown that collective 
organizations, e.g., trade associations, frequently rely on agreements among members to bring 
contract  disputes  under  arbitration  regulated  by  “laws”  and  procedures  established  by  the 
trade association itself (Milgrom, North and Weingast 1990; Bernstein 1992; Pirrong 1995). 
This is so either because formal rules of the game are absent or cannot rely on credible public 
institutions to be enforced, or because public courts cannot efficiently play their role, due to 
substantial procedural delays, overload, and so on... Private dispute resolution mechanisms 
would provide complementary solutions for reducing contractual costs and increasing credible 
commitments by overcoming failures of public institutions.   
One of the most elaborate argument supporting this perspective is based on the idea 
that  (incomplete)  formal  contracts  can  significantly  extend  the  self-enforcing  range  of 
informal  agreements.  This  approach  departs  from  the  premise  of  many  self-enforcement 
models that informal deals would be stable only when the long term pay-off associated to 
cooperative behavior would exceed gains from short term defection (Klein 1992, Lazzarini et 
al.  2004,  Greif  2005).  Under  these  conditions,  private  multilateral  reputation  mechanisms 








































1  6 
The “hybrid” perspective, which emphasizes complements between public and private 
institutions, takes another view, focusing as much on the ex ante prevention of litigations as 
on their ex post resolution. Formal private institutions generate administrative costs, but these 
costs can be compensated through collective gains made possible by the reduction of conflicts 
and  distrust  among  parties,  thus  providing  ex  ante  incentives  to  comply  with  contractual 
agreements. This cost-benefit equilibrium requires that all parties take advantage of formal 
trading rules complementing private agreements, with institutions that allow a  « win-win» 
solution (Pirrong 1995)
2.  
In a pioneering study focusing on the legal foundations of such formal institutions in 
the French agriculture, Danet (1982) introduced a distinction between two forms of collective 
organizations  that  could  support  such  equilibrium.  The  two  forms  depend  on  the  type  of 
parties involved and whether they implement discipline through public rules or by private 
self-regulation  among  members.  More  specifically,  he  differentiated  “intra-professionnal” 
from “interprofession” arrangements. The former are organizations which heavily rely on 
self-regulated discipline based on the relative homogeneity of stakeholders, like for example, 
cooperatives with farmers operating in the same area or developing similar activities.
3 In a 
sense, this is close to the operating mode of Maghrebi traders analyzed by Greif (1994). On 
the other hand, “inter-professional” arrangements involve more heterogeneity among their 
members, as they imply the participation of the many various firms and economic agents 
involved in specific vertical production chains. They usually require a more formal type of 
rules,  often  although  not  always  backed  by  public  authorities.  Examples  are  large  formal 
associations with representatives of farmers’ unions, cooperatives, private middlemen, agro-
food  firms,  and  even  representatives  of  retailers.  Such  complex  arrangements  need  to  be 
framed by formal rules going beyond bi- or multilateral agreements. The French system of 








































1  7 
Both types of arrangement require self-regulation. However, their underlying rationale 
is  different.  “Intra-professional”  arrangements  develop  because  parties  expect  increased 
benefits  due  to  enhanced  bargaining  power  in  bilateral  negotiations  with  large  agro-food 
firms as well as to the possibility of increasing their market power by rounding up larger 
quantities.
4  Quite  differently,  the  creation  and  sustainability  of  “inter-professional” 
associations is based on a more formal setting that focuses on coordination among otherwise 
competing actors in order to monitor adaptation through organized dialogues among parties. 
Obviously, reputation does not play the same role under these arrangements and tends to be 
superseded  by  formal  rules.  Our  central  proposition  is  that  formally  embedded  collective 
organizations such as these “inter-professions” are complementing private institutions of the 
“intra-profession”  type,  and  that  this  combination  extends  the  self  enforcing  range  of 
contracts. The next subsections substantiate this proposition. 
2.2. What Multilateral Reputation Mechanisms? 
Our starting point is the analytical framework developed by Klein (1992, 1996). This 
model  intends  to  explore  the  self-enforcing  range  of  contracts  in  the  context  of  bilateral 
agreements, when parties are confronted to the risk of contractual hold-up. Its underlying idea 
is  that  formal  contract  terms  should  provide  incentives  for  parties  to  the  arrangement  to 
commit  and  not  deviate.  Let  H  be  the  expected  gains  from  cheating  or  behaving 
opportunistically and K the private sanction imposed by the other party if she discovers this 
mischief or if contractual clauses are not applied. The self-enforcing range of the contract is 
then defined by the difference between H and K: contracts are self-enforcing if and only if K > 
H.  In the model, K can be interpreted as the discounted value of future returns on specific 
investments to be lost upon termination of the relationship, but also as the increased costs of 
purchasing inputs or supplying services through the market place once termination of the 








































1  8 
HS , respectively the hold up potential of a firm G and of its supplier S, and KG and KS, their 
respective private enforcement capital. Figure 1 illustrates adjustments that may be needed for 
extending the self-enforcing range of contracts. 
< FIGURE 1: REDUCTION OF “HOLD-UP” PROBABILITIES> 
Through formal contract terms, the objective of the two parties is to minimize the 
value of the expected probability of “hold-up”, that is, the sum of the areas in the tail of the 
two distributions, in which potential hold-up for each transactor is greater than its private 
enforcement capital. In other terms these are the areas in which expected gains exceed the 
costs resulting from the loss of reputation. The self-enforcing range of contracts thus defined 
can be modified by introducing specific clauses enforceable by courts as well, for example 
through the imposition of higher penalties if mischief is observed (Klein, 1996). In other 
terms, formalizing contracts allow to economize on the level of private reputation capital 
required for providing an adequate self-enforcing range among parties. Therefore, the model 
opens  the  door  to  some  complementarities  between  court  enforcement  and  private 
enforcement. 
Klein’s  approach  is  restricted  to  bilateral  relationships.  Implementing  multilateral 
reputation-based mechanisms involves much more complex rules (Greif 2005). In multilateral 
reputation mechanisms, the amount of sanctions must equal the sum of individual penalties 
defined  by  the  loss  of  expected  future  streams  of  revenue  obtainable  if  the  commercial 
relationships among N members could be maintained. However, punishing a specific trader 
becomes a very costly process since many participants are involved who must all be informed 
adequately and who must follow collective discipline. The overall system then relies on the 
effectiveness of incentives for those applying sanctions (Greif 1993). It requires that the net 
collective expected gains of reducing transactions costs covers the administrative costs of 








































1  9 
One main result of the analyses proposed by Klein and Greif is to show that even in 
the  absence  of  repeated  interactions  or  lack  of  observability/verifiability  of  individual 
behaviors,  private  reputation  mechanisms  may  still  work  and  provide  appropriate  ex  ante 
incentives for economic agents to not cheat ex post. However, a full answer depends on the 
identification  and  implementation  of  such  adequate  mechanisms.  Clay  (1997)  identifies 
several  possible  candidates,  with  two  polar  cases.  One  is  the  existence  of  decentralized 
arrangements such as informal coalitions of agents, for example family members or religious 
groups  in  which  control  is  easier  to  implement.  The  underlying  logic  is  that  reputation 
depends  on  links  between  past  behavior  and  future  payoffs.  The  typical  enforcement 
mechanism is ostracism, such  as a merchant  community punishing opportunist parties by 
denying  them  future  business.  The  other  polar  case  is  that  of  centralized  arrangements, 
grounded in formal private institutions like guilds or clubs (Milgrom, North and Weingast 
1990).  In  this  case,  reputation  is  monitored  by  a  central  authority,  like  private  courts  in 
Champagne’s fairs, which identifies cheaters and has authority and enforcement capabilities 
to punish, for example by implementing boycott of cheaters at future fairs.   
However,  these  private  multilateral  reputation  mechanisms  have  flaws.  Informal 
coalitions in relatively small communities make ostracism as well as shared social norms 
efficient (Ellickson 1989; Kandori 1992; Greif 1993; Aoki 2001). For larger communities, 
these mechanisms require the design and implementation of increasingly costly information 
and communication systems among members, with simultaneously increasing administrative 
burden  that  seriously  challenges  their  effectiveness  (Milgrom,  North  and  Weingast  1990; 
Greif,  Milgrom  and  North  1990;  Greif  2005).  This  suggests  that  spontaneous  organic 
institutions may have to leave way to intentionally designed institutions when the number of 
traders is large or when bilateral repeated interactions become rather rare (Greif 2005). In 
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2.3. Contract Law and the Stability of Private Institutions 
Indeed, a central issue for the efficiency of multilateral reputation-based mechanisms 
is their stability over time and their capacity to apply to extensive membership. Richman 
(2005) suggests that mechanisms such as private laws are restricted to long term players and 
sizable entry barriers, which in turn may create incentives for collusion, generating costs that 
affect negatively the total surplus to be shared in the long run. This could explain phenomena 
such  as  the  final  failure  of  the  Maghribi  network  (Greif  1994).  Clay  supports  this  view, 
showing  that  barriers  to  entry  and  exit  are  a  necessary  condition  for  coalitions  to  work, 
ensuring stable membership that supports the information network, mitigating asymmetries 
among parties and preserving the differential between earnings within or outside the coalition 
(Clay 1997; see also Kenney and Klein 1983).  
These barriers are often implemented through non-economic factors such as ethnicity, 
language, and so on. They tend to become porous when the expansion of the coalition is 
desirable or needed. Indeed, expansion requires relaxing the homogeneity of utility functions 
of participants. Open networks may enjoy lower costs to entry and exit. However, they also 
confront higher costs from one-time cheaters. This is very much of a nature similar to that of 
public goods. The larger the number of individuals benefiting from private information about 
the individual value of a specific good, the lower the probability of finding agreements that 
maintain the capacity of private institutions to retaliate against deviants (Pirrong 1995).  
With  multiple  and  heterogeneous  members  the  possibility  of  privately  policing 
collective actions is reduced: free riding problems develop and incentives to comply with 
collective  discipline  decline.  In  order  to  face  these  classical  problems,  private  ordering 
institutions  must  meet  two  conditions:  (1)  They  must  ensure  a  sufficient  degree  of 
« cohesiveness »  to  implement  self-regulation  and  collective  sanctions,  which  is  usually 
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of acceptability to motivate voluntary adhesions, thus facilitating compliance to sanctions and 
willingness to impose sanctions on others. Still, the fulfillment of these two conditions is not 
easy and conflicting interests and coalitions among heterogeneous members may challenge 
the existence and the stability over time of such private ordering institutions. 
One  important  consequence  is  that  in  situations  of  multilateral  reputation-based 
mechanisms, law enforcement by a supportive state may improve the efficiency of private 
institutions  by  backing  private  contracts  with  public  order,  thus  reinforcing  their  legal 
authority  and  legitimacy,  as  well  as  their  ability  to  provide  efficient  private  enforcement 
devices to their members (Pirrong 1995). Indeed, as suggested by Greif (1993), formal private 
enforcement  institutions  rely  primarily  on  the  balance  between  administrative  costs  and 
expected benefits from improved efficiency in the organization of transactions. The existence 
of a legal regime supporting private institutions might improve the functioning of the latter 
and  reduce  transaction  costs  through  a  more  favorable  trading  environment.  Therefore, 
supervision by public institutions may extend the self-enforcing range of contracts. 
3. Empirical Evidence: The Role of Interprofession in the French Cattle Industry 
The complementarities between private and public institutions play an important role 
in agricultural sectors. Because modern agriculture is almost everywhere organized as a chain 
system  that  involves  forms  of  collective  action  and  requires  monitoring  of  heterogeneous 
parties,  this  sector  offers  an  exceptionally  rich  field  for  studying  the  interaction  between 
collective  organizations  regulated  by  private  rules  and  legal  systems  intended  to  provide 
support. In what follows we analyze this interaction through the case of the French cattle 
industry
5.  
3.1. The Legal Framework 
In many European countries, the predominance in agriculture of relatively small and 
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contract law. This contractual framework presents at least two specific legal features. First, a 
special legal status has been developed that differentiates ‘production’ contracts from labor 
contracts.
6 Second, collective organizations in the sector have also benefited from a special 
status. Both aspects were introduced in contract laws in the 1960’s and 1970’s, mainly for 
protecting small farmers facing drastic market concentration and the consolidation of agro-
food industries.
7  
This  situation  is  not  exclusive  to  Europe.  Collective  organization  is  pervasive  in 
agriculture, where it represents a major tool for framing the development of markets (Pirrong 
1995).  Cooperatives,  marketing  associations,  producers’  groups,  marketing  boards…  have 
been extensively used to organize production and marketing. Moreover, rapid modernization 
and changing technologies in agriculture have generated uncertainties among farmers. The 
simultaneous  development  of  collective  organizations  and  new  contractual  forms  can  be 
viewed as a way to implement new risk sharing rules in this context (Ménard 1996).  
Legal changes in France regarding contract regulation provide some evidence. The so-
called  ‘production  contracts’  introduced  in  the  1960s  intended  to  protect  small  farmers 
increasingly dependent on large agro-food firms for their technology, food and medication for 
animals,  etc.,  from  possible  abuse  of  power  and  “unfair”  contractual  agreements.  These 
formal production contracts are mostly used for indoor productions of pig, veal, and poultry, 
requiring large investments and the development of dedicated assets by individual farmers, 
making them subject to potential hold-up by agro-food firms. Similarly, legal incentives for 
farmers  and  agro-food  firms  to  use  reference  contracts  (‘contrat-type’),  for  standard 
productions, and campaign contracts, which are contracts associated to seasonal production 
(essentially  fruits  and  vegetables)  and  renegotiated  periodically,  intended  to  provide 
guarantees of equal treatment to farmers while  simultaneously reducing negotiation costs. 
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quality standards at the beginning of each production campaign, defining a benchmark for 
individual  contracts.
8  The  experience  of  the  processed  vegetable  sector,  in  which  prevail 
formal  contracts  with  farmers  committing  to  sell  all  their  production  at  the  end  of  the 
production campaign, served as benchmark for the future evolution of contract regulation in 
agro-food sectors. A major problem that the implementation of these new arrangements faced 
was the absence of a formal authority that would support negotiations among parties ex ante 
and monitor the agreements ex post (Danet 1982). The problem was particularly severe with 
respect  to  the  definition  of  quality  standards  and  their  evaluation  in  the  determination  of 
prices to be paid to farmers. Indeed, potential cheating and opportunistic behavior on both 
sides mostly happen at this stage of the contractual process (see Chalfant and Sexton 2002).  
In order to improve the effectiveness of such contractual arrangements, lawmakers 
provided  a  legal  solution  in  1975,  with  the  adoption  of  the  French  Law  nr.  75-600  on 
interprofessional organizations in agriculture, implementing legal support to the creation of 
collective private organizations identified as “interprofessions”. Establishing such legal rules 
was and remains a challenging issue for lawmakers. In this case, as in many others in Civil 
Law countries, the legal framework had to fulfill conditions that guarantee: i) the degree of 
generality pertaining to the object of the contract law; and ii) the degree of flexibility needed 
to  facilitate  its  use  in  various  agricultural  sectors  (Danet,  1982).  This  legal  arrangement 
endows  the  beneficiaries  with  some  prerogatives,  particularly  the  transfer  from  public 
authorities  of  normative  as  well  as  coercive  power  regarding  contract  regulation  in  their 
specific sector. These collective organizations are at will, in the sense that creating them is left 
to  partners  and  that  access  to  interprofession  remains  open.  However,  once  a  specific 
organization has been set up, participation becomes compulsory. 
The  functions  and  organization  of  interprofessions  may  vary  across  agricultural 
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regulation in each sector. Three major benefits were expected from this extension of contract 
law to interprofessional organization in agriculture. First, this legal framework reinforces the 
legitimacy  of  contractual  arrangements  at  stake  since  it  involves  representatives  of  all 
organizations of a specific sector, including farmers’ unions, cooperatives, large and small 
retailers,  middlemen,  agro-industries  and  manufacturers.  Second,  interprofessional 
organizations are funded by a compulsory tax laid down by the Law and paid by all economic 
actors involved in the sector. This significantly reduces the costs of collecting contributions 
while financing the administrative costs of supervising the implementation of agreements. 
Third, an “interprofession” can establish collective agreements with a «clause of extension” 
that  makes  them  compulsory  for  all  firms  involved  in  the  sector  and  provide  the 
interprofession the legal authority for their enforcement. Hence, enforcement remains the sole 
responsibility of the interprofession, with no public bureaus involved.  
The counterpart is that participants benefiting from this legal support must comply 
with very restrictive conditions, which may challenge its attractiveness for many agents and in 
many agricultural sectors. One major restriction imposes having only one interprofessional 
association defined at the national level for each specific agricultural production
9. A central 
issue then becomes delineating the relevant perimeter of each “interprofession”. As a result, 
there is a lot of heterogeneity among the various agricultural sectors that have adopted this 
mode of organization. At the same time, each interprofession can be viewed as performing all 
functions identified by Schwartz (2000) as characterizing contract regulation mechanisms, 
that is: i) enforcing verifiable terms, ii) providing vocabulary, iii) interpreting agreements, and 
iv) supplying default rules.   
3.2. Collective Organizations in the Cattle Industry  
In  order  to  better  understand  the  role  and  governance  of  collective  organizations 
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which most contracts involving breeders remain highly informal so that they can hardly be 
enforced by public courts, although this remains theoretically possible. In agriculture, the role 
of collective organizations is an ongoing source of controversies, as repeatedly illustrated by 
recent administrative and judicial decisions (Ménard, 1998). In that respect, an interesting 
point is that the interprofessional mode of organization, as implemented in the French cattle 
industry, has not been submitted to the usual critics against anticompetitive arrangements 
based on collusive behaviour, centralized price determination, or quantity restrictions through 
production quotas, all practices that are prohibited by competition law
5.  
We collected extensive data on this interprofession through structured interviews with 
the  administrators  of  the  National  interprofession,  as  well  as  with  three  leading  Local 
Committees, located in the West of France (Brittany, Normandy and the Loire Valley), an 
area which represents 40 % of the total French cattle breeding and slaughtering activities. We 
also  analyzed  all  documents  available  either  from  these  organizations  or  from  public 
authorities:  decrees,  legal  statutes,  agreements  signed  by  the  interprofession,  minutes  of 
meetings and so forth.  
Formally, the national interprofessional association in the cattle industry was created 
by a legal decree of November 18
th, 1980, although it became effective only a few years later. 
At that time, the imposition of fees on all participants allowed the organization to reach a 
consensus  among  its  members  about  the  specific  functions  and  missions  of  the  national 
organization and its local committees, and to hire a staff for monitoring the arrangement. This 
legal birth followed less formal experiences developed in the 1970s in the three major leading 
production  regions  mentioned  above.  Normandy  developed  an  administrative  organization 
(CIRVIANDE) with the status of a union as  early  as 1970, while  Brittany  had created a 
nonprofit association (INTERBOVI) in 1977. In the Loire valley, representative organizations 
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economic  actor  involved  in  marketing  or  slaughtering,  without  specific  organizational 
arrangement  and  related  administrative  support  to  enforce  them.  The  creation  of  a  Local 
Interprofessional Committee, BOVILOIRE, sharing characteristics with those already existing 
in Normandy and Brittany, was adopted only after the national interprofessional association 
that emerged in 1980 could provide a legal support.  
Major  difficulties  with  the  private  agreements  experimented  by  these  local 
interprofessional  committees  before  they  joined  the  national  interprofession  explain  this 
decision. A first difficulty had to do with the size of multilateral agreements required under 
the  previous  arrangement.  Over  300  bilateral  contracts  should  have  been  signed  between 
farmers,  slaughtering  firms,  and  individual  merchants  or  cooperatives.  This  involved 
significant  negotiation  and  administrative  costs,  without  guarantee  that  all  parties  would 
accept and, even more important, would actually follow the rules. A second difficulty was 
financial. The costs mentioned above were funded by the regional professional organizations 
and  farmers’  unions.  Their  resources  were  limited  and  free  riding  developed  rapidly, 
particularly among small operators and notwithstanding the benefits generated for all parties 
to the agreements. A third difficulty had to do with the inter-regional trade between Brittany 
and the Loire valley, which generated tensions and competition distortions since the former 
region  was  imposing  stricter  rules  than  the  latter  so  that  individual  farmers  and  some 
slaughtering  firms  refused  to  sell  or  process  animals  that  were  coming  from  the  more 
latitudinarian  region.  The  legal  framework  defined  by  the  1975  Law  on  interprofessional 
organization in agriculture was therefore perceived as a solution to these difficulties through 
easier  access  to  financial  resources,  the  harmonization  and  stricter  supervision  of  grading 
rules, and improved capacity to enforce collective agreements.  
The main functions performed by the cattle interprofession since its creation are: (i) 
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mechanisms; (ii) The financial participation of  all parties to R & D oriented towards the 
automation  of  carcass  grading,  improvement  of  production  systems,  etc.;  (iii)  The 
development of collective campaign of information and communication with consumers.
10 
These functions unambiguously relate to the problems associated with multilateral reputation 
mechanisms  that  we  discussed  in  section  3.  Indeed,  a  major  role  of  interprofessional 
arrangements  is  to  facilitate  contracts  and  their  enforcement  through  the  development  of 
transparency in the organization of transactions and the allocation of quasi-rents. The first 
formal agreement in the cattle sector was signed only in 1988, since some of the major private 
slaughtering firms were initially reluctant to comply with the constraints imposed by such 
collective  agreements.  .  The  agreement  was  (and  remains)  about  marketing  conditions  of 
animals  over  six  months  of  age,  rules  of  access  to  specialized  market  places  in  order  to 
improve security of payments, risk sharing, etc. After the first so-called “mad cow” crisis of 
1996, it was extended to rules intended to improve consumers’ information on the origin, 
breed, and types of animals. Details of a typical agreement are provided in Table 1. 
11  
<TABLE 1: MAIN CLAUSES OF A TYPICAL AGREEMENT> 
3.3. Major sources of contract Litigations and their resolution 
Most clauses in this interprofessional agreement unambiguously relate to problems of 
quality  measurement  and  verifiability.  This  is  a  general  problem  in  contract  design:  as 
emphasized  by  Pirrong  (1995),  incomplete  quality  specification  of  what  is  traded  and 
problems  of  transfer  of  property  rights  among  contracting  parties  are  major  sources  of 
litigations in that they open the door to potential hold-up problems (Klein, 1996). Transactors 
must therefore invest in order to delineate and transfer their property rights and to enforce the 
deal  (Barzel  1997).  For  agricultural  products,  the  difficulties  often  result  from  complex 
problems  of  quality,  which  make  measurement  and/or  verification  in  a  timely  period 
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food safety constraints imposes serious limitations on the role of courts in solving litigation. It 
largely explains the increasing role of interprofessions in the organization of transactions in a 
context of rapid changes. 
In the cattle industry, the major change was the adoption of new pricing rules, with a 
switch from bilateral negotiations of prices in traditional livestock markets to posted prices 
fixed directly by slaughtering firms (more on this in section IV). The underlying rationale for 
this  change  was  that  it  would  reduce  search  costs  for  animals  dispersed  over  small, 
geographically scattered farms, as well as bargaining and measurement costs for the highly 
variable quality attributes of animals. However, the new rules raise severe problems of quality 
measurement, which is central for determining prices, since this is done when animals are 
already  in  the  slaughterhouse,  opening  door  to  opportunistic  behavior  or  to  beliefs  that 
slaughterhouses are behaving opportunistically.   
Quality measurement as a major source of litigations and distrust between farmers and 
agro-food  firms  is  well  documented  (Feusti  and  Feuz  1995,  Hobbs  1997).  Since  quality 
largely  determines  the  existence  and  size  of  quasi-rents,  measurement  errors  are  a  major 
source of potential hold-up problems among contracting parties (Barzel, 1982, Klein 1996). 
Although standardized carcass grading intended to reduce measurement errors comparatively 
to the traditional method of evaluating living animals,
12 the new pricing method remains open 
to ex post opportunism, with slaughtering firms downgrading animals. ‘Errors’ on grading can 
lead to as much as a loss of 15 to 20% of the value paid to the breeder. Although their 
distribution over a large number of animals considerably reduces their statistical significance, 
they still seriously affect perception of fairness by farmers.  
Indeed, beside the difficulty of direct observation of frauds by cattle raisers, reputation 
mechanisms and the activation of bilateral sanctions by individual farmers has no chance to 
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because of (a) observability problems since evaluating carcass requires a technical expertise 
that  cattle  raisers  do  not  have  or  master  very  imperfectly,  and  (b)  time  constraints  since 
complaints  should  be  examined  almost  instantaneously  (before  the  carcass  enters  the 
transformation process) while cattle raisers are often informed only several days after the 
slaughtering.  Of course, controls by parties external to the transactions are possible. In the 
French  cattle  industry,  a  quasi-public  organization,  the  Meat  and  Livestock  Commission 
(OFIVAL), operates random controls sporadically under formal delegation from the state. 
There is also the possible although quite exceptional intervention of the public bureau in 
charge of repressing frauds on products and services.
13 However, these public organizations 
suffer from limitations similar to those mentioned for public courts.  
This likely explains why breeders who initiated interprofessional organizations rapidly 
got their Local Committees involved in the provision of inspection services in order to help 
implementing agreements and to provide expertise on grading and quality measurement. For 
example, in Brittany, a pioneering region in that respect, this private inspection service make 
unexpected visits in each slaughterhouse of its  jurisdiction at least once a week, with  an 
extensive review with the manager of all carcasses recently graded. If differences are spotted, 
the inspector can require an adjustment in the payment to the farmer, and the slaughterhouse 
must  comply.  Such  action  would  be  almost  impossible  for  individual  farmers.  In  regions 
without these local services, farmers can turn to the quasi-public agency (OFIVAL). Statistics 
are not  available at the national level,  regarding the frequency and sources of litigations. 
However, we obtained from the Local Committee of Brittany detailed data that provide very 
significant indications on litigious factors between farmers and slaughtering houses (see Table 
2).  
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The total number of requested interventions (256 over 18 months) may appear almost 
insignificant when compared to the total number of transactions in this region (over 4 millions 
animals  annually  slaughtered).  However,  as  suggested  by  our  theoretical  framework  and 
confirmed by all our interviews, what matters is that this is enough to activate reputation 
mechanisms, deterring slaughtering houses to behave opportunistically and improving mutual 
trust among parties. One could even argue that the small number of requests signals that the 
reputation  mechanism  implemented  by  this  interprofessional  organization  works  well.  It 
operates  more  as  a  preventive  system  than  as  a  coercive  one,  minimizing  the  number  of 
potential disputes and economizing on transaction costs.  
3.4. The Threat of Collective Boycott 
Another  tool  in  the  hands  of  interprofessional  associations  as  private  contract 
enforcers lies in their capacity to activate retaliation. As emphasized by Greif (1989, 2005), 
multilateral reputation mechanisms developed in a context of repeated games with imperfect 
monitoring depend on dedicated information and communication systems and on the capacity 
to punish deviants. In the interprofession we studied, this takes two forms: (a) Procedural and 
formal agreements coordinated directly by the interprofession, as illustrated by the example of 
inspection services; and (b) Informal mechanisms that take the form of extra-legal boycott 
actions.  
In the interprofession of the cattle sector, procedural solutions operate as follows. If 
repeated non compliances to interprofessional agreements are observed, local committees can 
introduce a formal procedure, eventually leading to publication in specialized magazines of 
the appropriate information. This can obviously alter seriously the reputation of the deviant. 
Before going public, intermediate steps are built in to allow adjustment. Once an inquiry is 
opened, a formal report on deviant behaviors is addressed to the board of directors of the 
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offences, a written injunction is sent. Without appropriate changes, a third step is the invoice 
of a formal letter to the chairman of the professional union to which the deviant belongs. This 
person or his/her board can then engage disciplinary sanctions against the deviant, possibly up 
to banishment from the union (which is part of the interprofession, as it must be remembered). 
This is of course an extreme measure, to our knowledge never applied in the sector under 
review. The impact of banishment would also be less dramatic than the one observed in other 
situations  of  private  ordering  (for  example,  Milgrom,  North  and  Weingast  1990  or  Greif 
1993), since the opportunist could continue his activities, even if he has to support additional 
sanction costs imposed by his other trading partners. Still, the threat exists, with its potential 
impact on the deviant. One may wonder why slaughtering firms accept the intrusion of a 
private  enforcing  institution  in  their  business,  restricting  their  capacity  to  extract  a  more 
substantial part of the quasi rent. The only convincing justification we can see is that this 
collective organization contributes to the pacification and institutionalization of contractual 
relations,  opening  the  way  to  dialogue  among  parties  and  reducing  incentives  to  impose 
solutions through violent actions (Barzel 2002).  
This brings into the picture the second dimension of punishment. As noticed by Clay 
(1997),  one  striking  thing  about  private  institutions  is  the  infrequent  use  of  collective 
punishment. This does not preclude the possibility of such actions. Violence is another way to 
solve  conflicts  (Barzel  2002;  Alston,  Libecap  and  Mueller  1999).
14  When  it  happens,  it 
usually signals the urgent need for adjustments and changes in the equilibrium among parties. 
We argue that the success of the interprofession as a private ordering mechanism results from 
the  anticipation  by  participants,  particularly  slaughtering  firms,  of  the  risk  of  much  more 
costly enforcement mechanisms, especially the threat of collective sanctions such as boycott 
or economic blockade. Confronted to that risk, it is less costly for parties to accept control 
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institutions need powerful informal mechanisms guaranteeing coherent collective actions and 
effective  implementation  of  sanctions  by  all  members,  even  if  at  a  cost  for  individual 
members.   
In the French agricultural sector, farmers’ unions have assumed that role, implicitly 
complementing  interprofessional  organizations  by  taking  over  the  active  coordination  of 
collective actions (Duclos 1998). Boycotts and temporary blockades have been ritual in the 
sector  since  the  1960’s.  One  major  advantage  of  this  strategy  from  the  point  of  view  of 
farmers is that it requires a limited number of persons (and trucks, tractors, etc.), organized 
commando-like,  thus  reducing  risks  of  defection  and  free-riding.
15  However,  collective 
sanctions  of  this  type  remain  exceptional,  although  episodic  activation  without  specific 
reasons has been reported, likely as a strategy for maintaining credible threat (Greif, Milgrom 
and Weingast 1994).  
In the long run, procedural conflict resolution of the first type has clearly prevailed in 
interprofessions, thus confirming the hypothesis that private ordering develops as a mean for 
solving disputes, reducing conflicts, and minimizing transaction costs.  
4. Gains and Limitations 
The decision to rely on interprofessions or other modes of collective organization that 
are ‘private institutions’ with a legal status for implementing agreements and solving conflicts 
remains a private initiative in the hands of economic actors. But why do they choose the 
support of the law and this mode of self-enforcing arrangement? From an economic point of 
view,
16 the answer must lie in the balance between gains and costs of private institutions 
embedded in a legal framework compared to alternative solutions such as relying on public 
bureaus or going to courts.  
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Indeed, the creation of private contract-enforcement institutions is one option among 
others.  When  effective  public  institutions  exist,  parties  may  alternatively  choose  to  face 
enforcement  problems  strictly  through  contractual  relationships  (Greif  2005).  Bilateral 
arrangements may be preferred for defining property rights, identifying residual claimants, 
and narrowing or even eliminating sources of contractual hazards (Williamson 1985; Klein 
1992).  In  the  cattle  industry,  this  option  developed  before  that  of  interprofession 
organizations. Contractual agreements and private organizational solutions initially prevailed 
for  facing  a  major  change,  namely:  the  privatization  of  slaughtering  houses.  Privatization 
occurred in the 1970s, mainly motivated by the large investments required for meeting the 
new  European  sanitary  standards.  Producers’  groups,  mostly  organized  in  cooperatives, 
played an important role in that process. Of the 291 slaughtering houses in France,
17 only 25 
% are under public control, mostly boards (‘regies’) administered by local authorities, the 
remaining being in the hands of private firms and cooperatives, the later slaughtering about 
50% of the total French production.  
The significant involvement of producers’ groups was clearly motivated by the search 
for organizational solutions by farmers wishing to reinforce their bargaining power in their 
negotiations  with  increasingly  concentrated  agro-food  firms  (Danet  1982).  However,  it 
rapidly  became  obvious  that  collective  action  through  organizational  forms  such  as 
cooperatives had its limitations. First, they represent only half of the slaughtering houses and 
about one third of the transactions.
18 In a competitive environment, this imposes an important 
limit on the impact of their action. Second, the distortions affecting the grading system in the 
cattle  industry  generated  disparities  that  fed  conflicts.  Third,  these  distortions  in  the 
implementation  of  the  grading  system  also  revealed  the  relative  inadequacy  of  private 
contractual arrangements for dealing with the problems of verifiability, quality measurement, 
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The combination of these factors explains why parties turned to a more constraining 
solution, the interprofessional organization, which facilitated the adoption and enforcement of 
new  pricing  rules  preferred  by  slaughtering  firms,  particularly  by  switching  from  prices 
bilaterally negotiated on traditional livestock markets to a posted price mechanism involving a 
more direct relationship between slaughtering firms and their suppliers (Mazé 2000, 2002). 
However, efficiency gains expected from this change in pricing rules, through a reduction of 
information and bargaining costs previously supported by slaughtering firms, could have been 
ruled out by ex post measurement and enforcement costs (Barzel 1982; Wang 1993).  
Hence, the key role played by enforcement institutions, whether they are private or 
public. In our case, gains related to the adoption of the new pricing rules must be compared to 
the costs of organizing collective retaliation and to the costs of turning to enforcement by a 
third party. Since collective action is very difficult to build and tend to be taken over by the 
violent action of small groups, the costs of organizing collective action (on the sellers’ side) 
adding to the risk of costly retaliation by the commercial sector (on the buyers’ side) have 
pushed partners to endorse an alternative to violent coercion. Interprofessional arrangements 
looked like a viable solution despite their own running costs
19.   
4.2. The Changing Nature of Coalition as a Limit 
However, interprofessional organizations of that type have their own limitation. In 
order to effectively monitor conflicts and enforce contracts, they must remain neutral with 
respect to conflicting interests, although they are not really independent since they are born 
out of a coalition among parties to the arrangement… and to conflicts! These constraints point 
out the importance of their mode of governance. Lorvellec (1993) suggests that the efficiency 
of  such  organizations  is  conditioned  by  three  basic  rules:  representativeness,  parity,  and 
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In that perspective, the effectiveness of private institutions relies less on coercion than 
on  voluntary  commitment  and  shared  consensus  among  participants  that  have  their  own 
agenda. This explains the emphasis, in most studies on private ordering, on the homogeneity 
or  cohesiveness,  often  related  to  the  belonging  to  an  ethnic  community  or  a  specific 
professional  group  (Greif  1993,  2005).  This  is  not  so  with  the  national  interprofessional 
association of our sector. It involves 13 organizations, including representatives of large and 
small retailers, farmers’ unions, cooperatives, middlemen, private slaughtering firms, public 
slaughter houses, and wholesalers. In that context, the Law 75-600 adopted in 1975 grounded 
the legitimacy of interprofessional associations into public order and opened the possibility of 
more stable arrangements, particularly through the specific clause imposing that there be only 
one national interprofession for each agricultural sector. 
Nevertheless, the creation of such interprofessional association backed up by the law 
strongly depends on the free will of all representative professional organizations of a specific 
sector  to  adhere  and  balance  conflicting  interests  among  their  respective  members.  As  a 
matter of fact, representative bodies are populated by those who balance each other’s coercive 
and  economic  powers  (Greif,  2005).  Thus,  tensions  and  versatile  alliances  among 
participating organizations are at stake. One major source of these tensions came out of the 
industrial  consolidation  and  regional  specialization  that  occurred  since  the  1970s.  These 
trends increased the dependence of local farmers on agro-food firms located in the same area 
and  amplified  competition  among  regions.  Regional  links  developed  that  could  help 
superseding professional specificities at stake for the formation of stable coalitions. However, 
these forces go in opposite direction from those favoring the creation of an interprofessional 
association at the national level. Equilibrium between intra and interregional competition then 
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A  conflict  between  the  National  Interprofession  and  a  Local  Committee  (namely, 
Brittany)  regarding  the  collection  of  fees  financing  the  system  provides  evidence  of  this 
tension. The standard mechanism is that the money collected is sent directly to the national 
organization  that  then  redistributes  resources  to  local  organizations.  However,  Brittany 
rejected this solution and negotiated an alternative arrangement in which the money collected 
is channeled through the local organization that then forward the proportion agreed upon to 
the National level. Clearly, the choice of one solution rather than another changes the balance 
of power between the local and national level, giving financial leverage to different parties. 
This is especially so when some regions (or some groups) have a significant leadership, for 
economic or political reasons. As argued by Greif, Milgrom and Weingast (1994), rulers tend 
to lean towards the rights of groups that are well organized and have a large influence, turning 
away from groups less able to retaliate in case of opportunistic behavior from the dominant 
groups
20.  
4.3. Collective Organizations and the Scope for Self-Regulation 
General  conditions  under  which  private  ordering  institutions  embedded  in  a  legal 
framework are efficient can be drawn from our analysis of the cattle industry. What we have 
shown above is that the interprofessional association emerged primarily as a response to a 
change in the organization of transactions and the need to improve dispute resolutions and 
private contract enforcement. Efficiency considerations rather than just distributive or rent 
seeking strategies were the major drivers. However, the creation of an “interprofession” is 
only one option among others, so that other factors may influence this decision as well.  
Indeed,  the  nature  of  the  coalition  among  professional  organizations  and  with 
economic actors is a central issue (Johnson and Libecap, 2003). An essential component is 
that the creation of an interprofessional association help minimizing the costs of coalitions 
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creation  in  a  specific  sector  likely  varies  according  to:  i)  the  degree  of  industrial 
consolidation, which determines the size and number of agro-food firms involved; ii) the 
degree  of  regional  specialization,  which  involves  the  development  of  specific  assets  and 
specific comparative advantages.  
This is what we observe in the cattle industry. A low degree of industrial consolidation 
maintained a large number of firms, so that multiple parties were involved; and relatively 
weak  regional  specializations  of  breeding  activities  lead  to  unstable  coalitions.  The 
combination of these two conditions increased the expected benefits from an interprofessional 
coordination, especially regarding quality grading and private contract enforcement. Although 
the  leadership  of  one  region,  Brittany  in  this  case,  was  significant,  it  was  not  powerful 
enough, with less than 40% of the total national production, to impose its own rules and to 
prevent the creation of national interprofession.  
In other sectors, when leading firms prevail or when regional specialization is strong 
enough, an interprofessional organization is less likely to emerge as it is less costly for a firm 
to manage agreements ...and conflicts directly with local producer’s groups
21. This is what we 
observe, for example, in the French pork industry, in which most of the production is located 
in Brittany, or in the processed vegetable industry, in which the interprofessional association 
continuously  declined  since  the  1990’s  as  a  result  of  the  dramatic  concentration  in  the 
industrial  organization  of  the  sector.  Professional  self-regulation  and  decentralized 
negotiations at the firm level prevail in those cases, since they allow a reduction of bilateral 
bargaining costs with individual farmers while imposing the standards of the leading firm 
with respect to regulating transactions for a specific region or sector.  
5. Conclusion 
Private  institutions  play  a  central  role  in  the  efficient  organization  of  economic 
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transaction costs, for example by establishing quality classification or codification. They also 
contribute  to  extend  the  self-enforcing  range  of  contracts  in  a  world  in  which  not  all 
information is verifiable by an independent third party and in which courts cannot always 
enforce agreements. First, private enforcement institutions may enjoy industry expertise and 
specialized knowledge regarding industry transactions. Second, private rules can be tailored to 
idiosyncratic needs. Third, private systems are often able to act at lower costs than overloaded 
and procedure laden public courts. Fourth, they tend to produce more predictable outcomes.  
The analysis of one such private institution, the Interprofessional Organization in the 
cattle  industry,  confirms  that  private  institutions  represent  a  powerful  tool  for  reducing 
enforcement costs, particularly when dealing with multilateral agreements. In contrast with 
the emphasis in the literature on formal ex post arbitration systems, private institutions rather 
operate as ex ante mediation systems based on complex semi-formal arrangements. At the 
same  time,  we  have  shown  that  these  institutions  are  subject  to  severe  limitations  when 
multiple parties are involved. Taking this into account, we have argued that being embedded 
in a legal framework can reduce their cost of governance. However, this is not always a 
sufficient condition to ensure full convergence of conflicting interests: extra-legal actions may 
also play a role in building credible threat of retaliation.  
We  suggest  that  there  are  general  lessons  to  be  learned  from  our  specific  case 
regarding  the  complementarity  between  private  institutions  and  public  order  when 
multilateral agreements are involved. In this situation, transactors are confronted to coalitions: 
a legal framework imposing rules and procedures can under these circumstances complement 
the  role  of  private  institutions,  increasing  the  self-enforcing  range  of  contracts,  thanks  to 
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1 The delineation of “private” and “public” institutions remains controversial in the literature. 
In what follows we adopt the distinction proposed by Greif (2005), with public institutions 
relying on order and sanctions imposed by the state while private institutions are defined and 
implemented by economic agents themselves.   
2 In his analysis of the private enforcement mechanisms and rules designed by the Chicago 
Board  of  Trade,  Pirrong  (1995)  shows  that  the  implementation  of  new  rules  that  would 
increase the volume of transactions required legal intervention of the state to impose them, 
since some participants were loosing part of their bargaining power and their profits because 
of better delineated property rights and more transparency of transactions.  
3 Referring to the example of cooperatives, Hendrikse (2004) provides interesting elements in 
that perspective. 
4 There is usually a trade-off in that farmers have to accept restrictions, such as following 
technical rules and requirements defined by the group, committing to an “exclusivity rule” by 
delivering all their production for a specific product, and even delegating price determination 
to the group. At the same time, the “intra-professional” organization can take advantage of 
partial “territorial exclusivity” in representing farmers, thus guaranteeing a minimum level of 
activity  to  its  members  while  increasing  bargaining  power  through  collective  action  and 
reducing destructive competition although, as a group, it remains actor in a very competitive 
market. 
5
  Recently,  several  French  farmer  unions  in  this  sector  have  been  sued  for  having  been 
suspected of coordinating in order to influence upward prices paid to breeders during the BSE 
crisis of 2001 (see the decision of the European Commission of April 2, 2003 nr C (2003) 
1065, regarding possible collusion on prices in the beef industry; and the judicial decision of 
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unions), by the first level Court of Appeal of the European Community). There is no evidence 
that the interprofession was involved in such practices.  
6 Production contracts are agreements between an integrator company and farmers binding the 
later  with  specific  production  practices.  They  usually  have  two  main  components:  (a) 
allocating  responsibilities  for  the  provision  of  inputs,  and  (b)  determining  rules  of 
compensation for the farmers. Typically farmers provide land, buildings, utilities and labor 
while companies provide animals, food, medication, and even services of extra laborers. The 
legal term used in France for ‘production contracts’ is “contrats d’intégration” 
7 In France, this legal framework was implemented through several laws, particularly: Law nr. 
60-808 of April 08, 1960, on standard contracts (“contrats-types”); Law of August 08, 1962, 
on  collective  organizations  and  producer  groups;  Law  nr.  64-678  of  July  06,  1964,  on 
“integration”  contracts  and  “campaign”  contracts;  and  Law  nr.  75-600  of  July  10,  1975, 
providing support to “interprofessional” associations in agriculture. 
8 This sharply contrasts predictions from agency theory which focuses on the optimal design 
of individual incentives contracts. One possible interpretation is that gains over negotiation 
costs from standardized contracts by far exceed losses of incentive intensity from individually 
tailored contracts (Allen and Lueck 2002). 
9  This  possibility  creates  problems  in  delineating  the  perimeter  of  each  organization.  For 
example,  can  organic  producers  involved  in  multi-product  activities  be  organized  in  one 
single representative interprofessional association? 
10 This function became particularly significant after the BSE crisis since the Interprofession 
took a very active role in managing public relations, collecting scientific information and 
communicating with consumers. 
11 Dramatic changes in R&D funding of French agriculture since 2002 have largely diffused 
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contract enforcement. An example of a R&D project is the design and implementation of an 
automatic  grading  system  for  beef  carcasses,  with  the  expectations  of  a  more  objective 
measurement than that from employees of slaughtering firms. 
12 A 1977 decree, later modified and integrated in a European regulation adopted on August 
12, 1981, defined dressing and weighting rules for carcasses. However, the existence of this 
standard  mainly  introduced  for  facilitating  the  implementation  of  a  statistical  system  for 
regulating markets accordingly to rules of the Common Agricultural Policy (CAP) does not 
mean its effective use as a contracting clause. From a legal point of view, slaughterhouses 
remain fully responsible for grading carcasses. It must be reminded that slaughterhouses are 
private properties, to which access can be restricted. 
13 In France, Direction Générale de la Consommation, de la Concurrence et de la Répression 
des Fraudes (DGCCRF). 
14 In 1994, a complete physical blockade of the main slaughtering firms located in the Loire 
valley was implemented by coordinated groups of farmers. It was stopped three weeks later, 
after the accidental death of an employee of one of the slaughtering firms. 
15 It is easier for cattle breeders to use blockade than for producers of more perishable goods 
like, say, tomatoes. Indeed, cattle breeders are less time constrained, with marginal loss in 
animals’ quality and marginal costs feeding them if they deliver animals later on. 
16 Other approaches may be relevant here, e.g., political science or sociology. 
17  Data  from  2000.  See  Libecap  (1992)  for  an  analysis  of  the  determinants  of  a  similar 
evolution in the US. 
18  The  French  cattle  market  is  mainly  organized  through  intermediaries:  transactions  are 
processed by producers’ groups (32%), private middlemen (34%), or directly by slaughtering 
firms (15%), the remaining 19 % being traded on traditional livestock markets.  Less than 3% 
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19  Actually  a  tax,  imposed  by  the  Law,  is  defined  and  collected  by  the  interprofessional 
organisation at the national level. The tax was equal to 21 Euros/TEC in 2009, to be shared 
between  farmers,  slaughtering  firms  and  retailers.  The  annual  budget  of  the  national 
interprofession in the cattle industry is around 35 million Euros, with 35% of this budget 
redistributed to the Local Interprofessional Committee (LIC).   
20 Barriers to entry if they are tight enough may help keeping the coalition stable and facilitate 
enforcement (Bernstein 1992; Clay 1997; Richman 2005). However, they need also to be 
porous enough to allow the gradual expansion of the coalition over time, which is a condition 
for capturing gains from a better matching of agents to market opportunities (Clay 1997). 
Moreover, they often confront competition policies.  
21 In the case of quality certifications in the food sector, the level of quasi-rents generated by 
differentiation strategies might be high enough to cover added administrative costs generated 
by such interprofessional organization. This reduces the expected benefits from embedding 
the arrangement in the Law of 1975 on interprofessional organization and from complying 
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TABLE 1 : MAIN CLAUSES OF A TYPICAL AGREEMENT 
The Interprofessional agreement of 1988 on the market for cattle above 6 months of age. 
a- Transfer of property rights: Rules fixing delays between the agreement and animals’ removal at the farm, 
the maximal period between removal from the farm and slaughter, and standards for carcass presentation and 
weighting after slaughter. 
b- Transfer of risks : Clauses define responsabilities in case of the accidental death of the animal during its 
transportation or transfer to the slaughterhouse, as well as provisions regarding veterinary interventions by public 
authorities (Local Interprofessional Committees provide mediation when needed in order to guarantee the rapid 
intervention of veterinary experts since this is a very perishable product).    
c- Indidvidual Animal  identification : Standards establishing traceability systems in slaughterhouses, which is 
central  for sanitary purposes as  well for payments to farmers (messing  up animals  was, at that time, quite 
common in slaughterhouses so that farmers did not necessarily got paid for the ‘right’ animal).  
d- Conditions under which animals are weighted at the slaughterhouse: Clauses specify norms related to 
characteristics of carcass as well as delays between slaughtering and weighting (shrinking loss). 
e- Standardization of Information on ‘weighting tickets’ delivered to the seller: Detailed information must 
be provided to farmers allowing them to check that it corresponds to their animal and facilitating claims, which 
must be monitored by the interprofession in a very short delay. Some local committees even require slaughter 
houses to keep carcasses at least 24 hours in order to make verification possible before the animal is delivered. 
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Litigations  on 
carcass grading  
Responsibility  in  case  of 
animal  mortality  or 
sanitary seizure by public 
authorities 
Litigations  on  animal 
identification  or  loss  of 
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Step 1: The supplier accept a contract
With an ex post risk of quasi-rent
Appropriation due to possible 
Quality measurement problems.
Supplier S Firm G
Step 2: A private third party is set up
To supervise and control the execution
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